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Abstract. Coronal mass ejections (CMEs) strong enough to
create electromagnetic effects at latitudes below the auro-
ral oval are frequent events that could soon have substantial
impacts on electrical grids. Modern society’s heavy reliance
on these domestic and international networks increases our
susceptibility to such a severe space-weather event. Using a
new high-resolution model of the global economy, we sim-
ulate the economic impact of strong CMEs for three differ-
ent planetary orientations. We account for the economic im-
pacts within the countries directly affected, as well as the
post-disaster economic shock in partner economies linked by
international trade. For a 1989 Quebec-like event, the global
economic impacts would range from USD 2.4 to 3.4 trillion
over a year. Of this total economic shock, about 50 % would
be felt in countries outside the zone of direct impact, leading
to a loss in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 3.9 to
5.6 %. The global economic damage is of the same order as
wars, extreme financial crisis and estimated for future climate
change.
1 Introduction
Solar storms consist of three major components: solar flares,
solar proton events and coronal mass ejections (CMEs). All
of these cause “space weather” that affect humanity’s tech-
nological systems and society, as well as Earth’s atmosphere,
climate, and potentially the biosphere. Fast CMEs (≈ 1000–
2000 km s−1) are clouds of ejected plasma with embedded
magnetic fields that can interact with Earth’s magnetic field
after an observed travel time as short as 15 h to create a geo-
magnetic storm (Cliver and Svalgaard, 2004). Following this
impact, Earth’s magnetic field can be disturbed worldwide
for days (Bolduc, 2002), allowing more energetic solar and
magnetospheric charged particles to find their way along the
open magnetic field lines near the Earth’s poles through the
ionosphere and atmosphere to the surface. Many details of
the associated physics are still unclear. However, currents and
electric fields associated with enhanced particle precipitation
can induce massive ground currents in electrical distribu-
tion networks which could result in large-scale power black-
outs and permanent damage to electric transformers (Pirjola
et al., 2000).
The strength of the induced currents depends on a number
of factors. They usually increase with geomagnetic latitude,
transmission line length and voltage, but decrease with dis-
tance to the ocean and increased ground resistivity (Wei et al.,
2013). Space-weather events also cause auroras, usually in
two small ovals around 65 (±5) degrees northern and south-
ern latitude that vary in size, location and intensity during ge-
omagnetic storms. The geographical distribution of the dam-
age caused by a geomagnetic storm is very complex. Other
observed consequences of geomagnetically induced currents
(GICs) include damage to pipelines and telecommunication
cables, accelerated corrosion, physical and electrical damage
to satellites, and disruptions to radio navigation, which can
particularly affect the transport and aviation sectors (Royal
Academy of Engeeniering, 2013).
In 1989, Earth experienced its largest space-weather event
in several decades: a geomagnetic storm that caused a power
blackout in Quebec that left millions of people without elec-
tricity for hours. It permanently damaged transformers in
Canada, the USA and the UK, and disconnected other power
transmission devices from California to Sweden (Erinmez,
2002; Lakhina et al., 2005). This storm caused damage across
about 120◦ of longitude and 5–10◦ latitude, and lasted for
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more than 12 h. The Quebec power grid went from nor-
mal operations to complete shutdown in 90 s. Temporal
changes in the geomagnetic field of dB/dt = 1100 nT min−1
were experienced and the strength of the storm, in terms
of the disturbance storm index, which measures how much
Earth’s magnetic field is weakened, was estimated to be
Dst =−640 nT. Two other strong storms in the 20th century
include a dB/dt = 5000 nT min−1 storm in May 1921, the
biggest geomagnetic event in the last century. It lead to au-
rora borealis over Samoa, and a fast CME in October 2003
which, despite its low strength of Dst =−472 nT, caused ef-
fects at latitudes as low as South Africa, where it incapac-
itated several large electrical transformers (Lakhina et al.,
2005). Regions with latitudes below 30◦ S were previously
thought to stay free of damage.
Studies and anecdotal evidence suggest the most severe
space-weather event in the last 450 years was the Carrington
event of September 1859 (e.g., Cliver and Svalgaard, 2004).
This storm caused auroras visible within 23◦ of the equator
in both hemispheres, e.g., in Honolulu, Havana, and Rome
(Tsurutani et al., 2003). In the United States and Europe,
fires were started by arcing from currents induced in tele-
graph wires (Green et al., 2006). The strength of this storm
has been estimated to be 850 nT≤Dst ≤−1760 nT (Lakhina
et al., 2005; Sicsoe et al., 2006; Tsurutani et al., 2012). In
August 2013, a CME of Carrington size missed the Earth by
a week, or 90◦ in heliographic longitude.
Although a solar maximum period might have a higher
frequency of intense solar storms, there is no evidence that
this will affect the intensity of any single event (Hapgood,
2012). Indeed, the 1859 event occurred outside of solar
maximum. The probability of a Carrington event (based
on Dst < 850 nT) per decade is estimated to be 12 %, or
a once-in-a-century event like a 9.0 earthquake (Riley, 2012;
Love, 2012). It has been estimated (Thomson et al., 2011)
that dB/dt changes of 1000–4000 nT min−1 (Dst = 2000–
5000 nT) for a storm occur every 100 years and dB/dt
of 1000–6000 nT min−1 (Dst = 3000–6500 nT) every 200
years. These frequencies are comparable to other severe
natural disasters, such as large earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions. Power grids typically experience problems when
the rate of change of the magnetic field exceeds a 100–
200 nT min−1 (Wei et al., 2013). Occurring today, the Que-
bec 1989 event or the 1859 Carrington event would have a
profound impact on the daily lives of millions of people, both
through direct effects and via the impacts to the globalized
economic production system.
Little has been done on economic modeling of severe
space weather so far, and previous studies have mostly fo-
cused on the USA. It has been estimated in NAOS (2008)
and Showstack (2011) that a storm similar to that of 1859
or 1921 could cause damage of several trillion US dollars in
the USA in the first year alone, and that recovery could take
years. The estimated damage to the power system in Quebec
in 1989 is in the range of USD 2 billion, whilst the total dam-
age is estimated to be around USD 13 billion (Kappenmann,
2010; Boteler, 1998). Another study estimates that the eco-
nomic losses in North America and Europe for a power
blackout for 5 months caused by a Carrington-like event
would be between USD 0.5 and 2.6 trillion (Lloyd’s, 2013;
Wei et al., 2013). It has also been estimated that a North
American power grid blackout would result in a GDP loss
in the USA of about USD 30 billion per day, accumulating
to over USD 10 trillion per year (Lloyd’s, 2013). None of
the cost estimates consider global effects due to international
trade.
The complex and interconnected network of today’s glob-
alized economy and infrastructure makes it difficult to pre-
dict the exact effects of a severe space-weather event. There-
fore, we focus on the most economically important impact
from such an event: the interruption of electrical distribu-
tion grids and failure of electric power transmission systems.
We combine a simple physical model for disruption of power
grids with the most comprehensive and most highly resolved
economic input–output framework of the world economy to
estimate the direct and indirect economic costs of severe
space-weather events of sizes between the Quebec 1989 and
Carrington 1859 events.
The reduction of production capacities γel of the electricity
sector for each country C = 1, ...,187 is dependent on the
size S and the location φ0 of the event. Specifically,
γel = F(S)A−1C
∫
dAG(S,C,φ0) (1)
= F(S)A−1C
∫
dAe
−(φ−φ0)2
2σφ(S)2 ×
[
e
−(θ−θ0(S))2
2σθ (S)2 + e
−(θ+θ0(S))2
2σθ (S)2
]
.
The quantity G(S,C,φ0) is the product of a Gaussian in lon-
gitude φ, centered at longitude φ0 (which corresponds to the
time when the event occurred) with event-dependent stan-
dard deviation σφ(S), that depends on the event size S, times
the sum of Gaussian distributions in latitude that model the
event-dependent auroral ovals centered at ±θ0(S) with stan-
dard deviations σθ (S). Figure 1 illustrates the double-banded
nature of the affected areas.
How should θ0(S), σθ (S) and σφ(S) vary with S? Not-
ing that the magnetic field B(r) at radial distance r from
a long axial current I varies as B(r)= µ0I/2pir , where µ0
is the permittivity of free space, it is clear that the distance
r , at which the same value of B is observable, increases lin-
early with I . Thus, as a first approximation σθ (S) and σφ(S)
should vary linearly with I , and also with S. Observations
show that θ0(S) decreases from values near to 65◦ geograph-
ical latitude as S increases, since the aurora moves equator-
ward as geomagnetic storms and the associated currents in-
tensify and then move poleward as the driving currents de-
crease and the system recovers (Baumjohann et al., 1980).
Thus, the geographical area in which a certain level of dam-
age occurs should vary as S2, but should move equatorward
as S increases.
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Figure 1. Earth at night with Quebec-like events over the Americas (scenario 1), Europe and the southern ocean (scenario 2), and East Asia
and Australia (scenario 3). The red area has the highest storm intensity normalized to 1. The storm’s intensity has a Gaussian falloff.
We assume σθ = 2±1◦ and σφ = 20±5◦ for a storm sim-
ilar to the Quebec 1989 space-weather event. This storm has
a footprint of about 80◦ of longitude and about 8◦ of lati-
tude in both the northern and southern hemisphere. Since the
Dst and AL values for the Quebec 1989 and Carrington 1859
events are believed to have differed by a factor of 3, the geo-
graphical footprint of the Carrington event is expected to be
a factor of 9 larger and the values of σθ and σφ each a fac-
tor of 3 larger. From the physical model, σθ = 6± 3◦, and
σφ = 60±15◦. During the Carrington event, auroras were ob-
served as far south as 20◦ latitude with the latitudinal spread
observed to be 45◦, and the longitudinal domain was close to
180◦ (Green et al., 2006). Accordingly, the model is consis-
tent with observations.
For each country, the total impact of the storm is the quan-
tity R that integrates the storm’s effects as a function of geo-
magnetic latitude and longitude over the country’s area. The
storm is modeled like a flash-like impact. Outside the area of
impact, the damage in the electricity sector is zero. Storms
weaker than the Carrington 1859 event but stronger than the
Quebec 1989 event could result in around 10–20 damaged
transformers in the US alone (OECD, 2011; MITRE, 2011;
UK House of Commence Defence Committee, 2012). Even
the failure of a small number of transformers serving a highly
populated area, like the ones we choose in our scenario, is
enough to create prolonged power outage. We assume that
the storm causes damage which will last a year since the pro-
duction and supply of a replacement transformer could take
up to more than 12 months, as could the restoration of a grid
damaged over a huge area (OECD/IFP, 2012).
In order to quantify the economic impacts of a severe
space-weather event, we simulate the consequences of ma-
jor disasters by utilizing Leontief’s input–output (IO) theory
(Steenge and Boèkarjova, 2007; Leontief, 1966). IO analy-
sis has been used extensively for investigating the repercus-
sions of changes in one part of an economy on other parts of
the same economy (see the recent articles by Lenzen et al.,
2011; Wiedmann et al., 2013). IO databases are routinely
published by more than 100 national statistical bureaus in
the world. More recently, a number of teams have assem-
bled large-scale, detailed global multi-regional input–output
(MRIO) databases, which contain the same set of data but are
integrated for all world regions or countries (Tukker and Di-
etzenbach, 2013). MRIO tables can be used in the same ana-
lytical manner as national IO tables, for investigating effects
that ripple along global supply-chain networks (Leontief and
Strout, 1963). In this study, we utilize the most detailed of
these global MRIO database, distinguishing M = 187 coun-
tries with 25–400 sectors per country (Lenzen et al., 2013).
The economic model captures more than 99.99 % of global
trade.
2 The model
IO tables show transactions occurring within an economy:
the flow of money and the counterflow of goods and ser-
vices. The intermediate or inter-industry transaction ma-
trix T contains transactions occurring between industries or
sectors. For example, the manufacturing industry buys ba-
sic steel from the steel manufacturing industry, which, in
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turn, purchases iron ore from the mining sector. The pur-
chasing sectors are listed horizontally along the columns,
while the sectors running vertically down the rows are sell-
ing the goods and services. The transactions contained in T
are termed intermediate because the purchases are products
which are themselves used in the production of other prod-
ucts. The purchase of final products occurs in the final de-
mand vector y. These are products produced for the final
consumer. A basic requirement of IO tables is that they bal-
ance out; the inputs to an economy must equal the outputs.
The total output of the economy is equal to the output of in-
dustry plus the output to final consumers. To accomplish the
addition of the corresponding matrices, a summation opera-
tor is used: x = T 1+ y, where 1 = {1,1, . . .,1}’ is an N × 1
summation operator.
Most often, productive activity in modern economies is as-
sumed to be demand-driven, and the so-called demand-pull
model is evoked, where an initial change vector 1y in final
demand y (N × 1, for example, decreased household con-
sumption caused by reduced electricity supply) causes flow-
on effects that ripple through a complex upstream supply-
chain network, and ultimately leads to a change 1x in to-
tal output x (N × 1) of an economy. The scalar N holds the
number of sectors (industries and/or products) that are dis-
tinguished in the IO matrices. We distinguish P = 15909
country-sector pairs (Lenzen et al., 2013, 2014) using data
from 2011. The flow-on effects can be enumerated using
an N ×N IO transactions matrix, T, according to 1x =
(I−Txˆ−1)−11y = (I−A)−11y, where I denotes an N×N
identity matrix, the hat symbol “ˆ” denotes matrix diagonal-
ization, and A = Txˆ−1 is the matrix of input coefficients.
This relationship follows from the national accounting iden-
tity, which states that x = T1+ y = Ax+ y. A transaction
matrix, T, is essentially a square matrix with elements Tij
that represent the supply of products i for use in industry
j . Matrices T and A thus include information on industrial
interdependence and production structures in an economy,
which can ultimately be used to trace flow-on effects of initial
changes along supply chains that link all sectors in a global
economy.
Rather than following the effects of changes in final de-
mand on levels of total output, we analyze a situation where
the output of economies undergoes forced changes, and study
the effects that these changes have on final demand or con-
sumption possibilities. Such studies are generally known as
disaster-impact analysis (Li et al., 2013; Okuyama, 2007).
Our approach to estimating the direct and indirect conse-
quences of a severe space-weather event affecting a specific
set of countries C = 1, . . .,M and industries i = 1, . . .,N
leads to an N ×N diagonal matrix of fractions γ of produc-
tion capacity lost due to the event. The diaster-impact method
and the derivation of the γ matrix are described in detail in
Appendix A.
0(C, i)=
γC=1,i=1 . . .
γC=R,i=N
 , (2)
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. 0 not only has entries in the electricity sec-
tor(s), but also in the industrial sector(s) directly and indi-
rectly affected by reduced electricity supply. In assuming that
pre-disaster production is represented by total output x, the
post-disaster production possibilities are then x˜ = (I−0)x.
This formulation is equivalent to the model in Eqs. (17) and
(21)–(23) in Steenge and Boèkarjova (2007). The result of
a reduced industrial production x˜ is a state of reduced post-
disaster consumption, i.e., final demand y˜. Since Ax˜+y 6= x˜,
the national accounting identity does not hold after the dis-
aster, and the global economy is in imbalance. In particu-
lar, the reduced output is insufficient for satisfying final de-
mand y. Reduced post-disaster consumption possibilities are
y˜ = x˜−Ax˜. Note that this formulation assumes that the pro-
duction recipe A is constant, at least in the short term (within
a year). This means that production processes in those indus-
tries affected cannot be altered (for example, by substituting
electricity with other energy carriers) in order to make up for
lost capacities.
In a case where final demand is unable to shoulder the en-
tire loss in production possibilities, we examine the Leontief
inverse or total requirement matrix L = (I−A)−1. L = [lij]
reveals how much gross output of each sector is required
to meet final demand. We then see that the lost electric-
ity supply is quite an important production input for some
sectors, but a very small input for others. If electricity is
a very small input (we define a threshold for small), we de-
cide that this sector is not hit by the global cascade, e.g., be-
cause this sector can substitute the small input with some
other commodity. For sectors in which electricity is a signif-
icant input (LC,i > threshold), we reduce the output of that
sector as described above. The threshold is determined ac-
cording to the global requirement of electricity supply from
the electricity sectors directly damaged due to the geomag-
netic storm (Fig. 2). In scenario 1, for example, 1328 dif-
ferent sectors require two times 10−5 the total supply from
the damaged electricity sectors as a production input. If the
total required production input of one of these sectors is typ-
ically USD 2 billion, and electricity supply from the dam-
aged sectors is 2× 10−5 of it, USD 1000 worth of electricity
are required as a production input. We argue that this sector
can substitute USD 1000 worth of input of electricity with
USD 1000 worth of, for example, wood. Our threshold for
this scenario is 2× 10−5.
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Figure 2. Global production requirement of supply from damaged electriciy sectors. The treshold for scenario 1 is 2× 10−5, for scenario 2
5× 10−5, and for scenario 3 1× 10−6.
3 Results
A large number of calculations run in which the storm size
S, the damage factor F(S) – which describes the lost pro-
duction capacity in the event-affected electricity sector(s) –,
and the location φ0 of the storm were varied. Considering di-
rect effects only, we simulated a complete grid shutdown in
the USA, i.e., F(S)= 1. This scenario leads to direct eco-
nomic damage in the USA of about USD 25 billion per day,
which is similar to the USD 30 billion per day impact esti-
mated (Lloyd’s, 2013). To simulate the economic damage
of Quebec- and Carrington-like events, we use F(S)= 0.1,
meaning that, in areas of maximal storm intensity, 10 % of
the electricity supply is lost, in order to get similar dam-
age as estimated in previous studies. Using this value for
F(S), while still considering direct effects only, a Quebec-
like event occurring today centered over Quebec would cause
daily economic damage in Canada of USD 165 million and
USD 2.65 billion in the USA. This value is close to the es-
timates of USD 13 billion over 5 days for the event (Boteler
et al., 1998). Similarly, a Carrington event occurring today
centered near New York (φ0 = 40◦ N, θ0 = 75◦ W) would
lead to direct economic damage of about USD 1.2 trillion
for 5 months in the USA alone. These results are in line
with prior estimates of USD 0.5–2.6 trillion (Wei et al., 2013;
Lloyd’s, 2013). Note that all economic impact studies con-
ducted to date do not consider indirect effects due to dis-
rupted intra- and international trade.
We run the model, still with F(S)= 0.1, but now con-
sidering direct and indirect effects, with Quebec-like scenar-
ios for six different locations (Fig. 1): centered over Amer-
ica at φ0 =±45◦ N and θ0 = 80◦ W (scenario 1), over Eu-
rope/Africa at φ0 =±50◦ N and θ0 = 10◦ E (scenario 2), and
over Asia/Australia at φ0 =± 35◦ N and θ0 = 125◦ E (sce-
nario 3). These targets were chosen as economically worst-
case scenarios since they affect densely populated and highly
industrialized regions.
In all scenarios, we see economic damage not only in the
countries directly affected by the storm, but also in partner
countries affected by disruptions in international trade and
supply chains (red shading in Figs. 3–5). This is because in-
dustries that rely on imports that, in turn, directly or indi-
rectly depend on supplies from the damaged electricity sec-
tor(s), face input shortages, and hence have to scale back
their production. However, we also find that some countries
are faced with increases in consumption possibilities (green
shading). This is because industries producing inputs that are
directly or indirectly required by the damaged electricity sec-
tor(s) are not needed anymore since the electricity sector(s)
operates at reduced capacity, and hence the output of the
industries producing these inputs is available for additional
domestic consumption. Whilst the latter situation provides
in principle increased consumption possibilities, our model
does not reveal whether adequate final demand will in fact be
forthcoming to absorb the surplus production capacity. For
the purpose of this study, we simply report on two types of
economic imbalances, where (a) shortages of electricity in-
puts lead to production deficits and curtailed demand, and
where (b) reduced demand for inputs by (an) electricity sec-
tor(s) leads to surplus production that may remain unused.
For scenario 1 centered over the Americas, we find (Fig. 3)
that disruption of US power utilities would cause major
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Figure 3. Effects of scenario 1, a Quebec 1989-like event centered over the Americas. Globally, the storm would reduce total consumption
possibilities by 3.9 % though the effect is uneven: it is most severe in countries directly affected and their economic partners, while other
countries (e.g., Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, and Egypt) may gain consumption possibilities in the post-disaster economy.
losses in Canada (for example, due to reduction in US ve-
hicle supply), Germany (reduction in supply of US pharma-
ceutical products, industrial machinery and precision equip-
ment), and China (electrical equipment, aircraft, plastic prod-
ucts). Economic loss for Canada in relative terms is even
larger than for the USA, even though the USA is far more
severely affected directly by the storm, because of Canada’s
smaller economy and strong dependence on key US exports.
Countries featuring surplus production are those that special-
ize in exporting key resources into the USA; for example,
Russia (petroleum, aluminum, nickel, iron and chemicals),
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Algeria
(oil), South Africa and Gabon (precious minerals), France
and Sweden (aircraft parts, power generating equipment),
and Finland (paper). An examination of the UN Main Ag-
gregates database (UNSD, 2011) shows that almost all of the
countries characterized by increased consumption possibili-
ties feature a consistent and significant trade surplus (Qatar,
Libya, Gabon, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, Oman, Algeria, Azer-
baijan, Russia, Angola, Myanmar, Iran, Kazakhstan).
Scenario 2 looks markedly different (Fig. 4). It appears
that the world’s dependence on European exports of all kinds
means that virtually all countries, except for the USA, are af-
fected by GDP losses as a result of a severe space-weather
events over Europe. The USA registers net-production sur-
plus because of key exports to Europe, such as integrated cir-
cuits and other semiconductor products, pharmaceutical and
chemical products, as well as vehicles and aircraft.
Scenario 3 (Fig. 5) shows that a space-weather event af-
fecting China, Japan, Korea and Australia causes GDP loss
across most of Europe. Libya, Iran and Azerbaijan are ex-
ceptions because of their significant oil exports. The role of
the USA requires closer examination. For example, whilst
China received net damage from a storm over the USA, the
USA appeared to be affected by surplus production as a re-
sult of a storm over China, even though China’s exports to the
USA far outstrip US exports to China. This is because, whilst
US exports to China (semiconductor components, soybeans,
aircraft, and cars) are important inputs into further produc-
tion, China’s exports to the USA (digital disk drives, clothes,
games, toys, furniture) are mostly destined for the final con-
sumer, and hence have no damage-multiplying effect. Brazil
is an equally interesting case here, because, whilst being a net
importer from the USA and most of Europe, it is a net ex-
porter to China, Japan, Korea, and Australia, and hence reg-
isters surplus production after a storm.
The economic model considers both direct impacts in
international trade, such as the shared international power
grids in Europe, and the indirect effects due to interrupted
supply chains. In scenario 1, an American storm, indirect
plus direct effects are calculated to reduce global consump-
tion possibilities by 3.9 % or USD 2.4 trillion. In scenario 2
(the European storm), direct and indirect effects are calcu-
lated to reduce global consumption possibilities by 5.6 % or
USD 3.4 trillion. In the Asia-centered storm of scenario 3, the
storm is estimated to reduce global consumption possibilities
by 5.0 %, or USD 3.1 trillion.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we concentrated on the possible impact of se-
vere space-weather events on the electric distribution system.
A space-weather event is substantially different from other
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Figure 4. Storm scenario 2: a Quebec-like event centered over Europe. Due to Europe’s participation in many global supply chains, a disaster
in Europe would be felt not just in the continent itself, but in nearly all other countries in the world as well. The US is a notable exception:
their economy could experience a slight increase in consumption possibilities in the post-disaster economy.
Figure 5. In scenario 3, an Australasian storm, the effects, again, are seen most strongly in the directly impacted countries and their trade
partners.
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natural disasters on Earth. Whilst hurricanes, earthquakes
and tsunamis could cause direct human losses, a solar storm
is likely to cause material damage only. Although radiation
risks for astronauts and airline passengers on polar routes are
described in the literature, no human losses as a consequence
of a solar storm have been recorded, and they are therefore
not considered in this work, for example, as a loss of labor.
A severe space-weather event could be the worst natural
disaster in modern history with global costs estimated to be
over 5 % of world GDP and impacts reaching across every in-
dustry and every segment of society. Extreme space weather
will impact severely on society’s infrastructure – networks of
trade, transport and production would need to adapt globally.
In our modern, globalized economy, shocks to the production
system in one country can cause large ripple effects in part-
ner economies. Reduced inventories, increased shipping, the
rise of just-in-time production and the acceleration of spe-
cialization and trade mean that the global economic produc-
tion system, while more productive in total, is increasingly
more vulnerable to shocks. We have considered the possible
impact of a century-scale space-weather event on the global
economy. The results indicate that total losses could be up to
USD 3.4 trillion or 5.6 % of global GDP, and impacts would
affect sectors and populations well outside the direct area
of impact. Changes in the intensity and timing of a space-
weather event result in different global economic damage.
In comparison, global financial-crisis episodes lead to
losses estimated between 2.95 and 4.54 % of world GDP
(Kappy and Vegaz, 2012). Economic impacts from climate
change have been estimated to cost USD 125 billion yr−1
(GHF, 2009). Our scenario estimates global GDP damage in
between climate change and global financial crisis.
5 Conclusions
For the first time, a physical and economic model have been
combined to analyze the global economic impacts of severe
space-weather events affecting major global industrial re-
gions like the Northeastern USA, central Europe, and South-
east Asia. Macroeconomic models, such as the input-output
model we are using in this study, have been used for impact
analysis for some time. Such models can be used specifically
to provide an estimate of the system-wide impact, including
those of international trade and global supply chains.
We find that a severe space-weather event could lead to
global economic damage of the same order as wars, extreme
financial crisis, and estimated future climate change. But
some countries may even benefit from the disaster in terms
of higher domestic-consumption possibilities. A lot of details
of the dependencies between solar activity, geomagnetic ac-
tivity, and failure of electric distribution systems are still un-
clear. However, we provided a new physical model that re-
lates the damage done to the national power systems to the
strength and size of a geomagnetic storm.
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Appendix A: Disaster impact method
Assume a disaster analysis setting as in Steenge and
Bo`karjova (2007). In its original form, this method allowed
only for changes in consumption possibilities, i.e., reductions
in final demand, and excess production available for final de-
mand. There is no provision for situations in which the pro-
duction loss is larger than total final demand, i.e., where in-
termediate demand has to be affected by the disaster. In this
study, this circumstance is dealt with by introducing sharing
parameters, and dividing the total damage to a sector between
its deliveries to intermediate and to final demand. This way,
a situation in which damage to final demand is larger than
that of total final demand can always be avoided by setting
the share parameter appropriately.
Reductions in the production of a damaged sector only
affect those intermediate sectors that receive a significant
enough input from the damaged sector. Intermediate sec-
tors that receive only marginal inputs from a damaged sector
are assumed to be able to substitute for the reduced input,
or slightly alter their production recipe otherwise, so they
can keep producing at pre-disaster levels. The distinction be-
tween marginal and significant inputs is controlled by manu-
ally setting a threshold.
Let A be an N×N input-coefficient matrix, y (N×1) final
demand, x (N × 1) total output, and I a suitable identity ma-
trix. Define
{
x˜, y˜
}
as the post-disaster quantities of {x,y}. As
in Steenge et al. (2007), we ask that the post-disaster econ-
omy
{
x˜, y˜
}
is in balance:
x˜ = Ax˜+ y˜⇔ (I−A)x˜− y˜ = 0 ⇔ [I−A− I]
[
x˜
y˜
]
= 0.
Introduce damage parameters 0 so that x˜i = (1−0i)xi . 0i
is the relative production loss of sector i. 1−0i is the rela-
tive remaining capacity of sector i. The following approach
let part of the production loss affect intermediate demand,
so that the loss affecting final demand is never larger than to-
tal final demand itself: yi−y˜i = λi(xi−x˜i)= λi0ixi ⇔ y˜i =
yi − λi0ixi . λi is the factor that splits the production loss
xi − x˜i into a fraction yi − y˜i imposed on final demand, and
the remainder on intermediate demand. Assuming a constant
production recipe A = const., a reduction in only one inter-
mediate input Tij from a damaged sector i means that the
entire production of sector j must go down in the same pro-
portion as the reduced input i. Here, the production of those
sectors j is reduced, where input i formed a significant con-
tribution of sector j ’s production recipe. Where this is not the
case, sectors j are allowed to operate at pre-disaster levels of
output.
The loss of production of the electricity sector(s) is repre-
sented by 1xel = γel · xel. This loss affects the power supply
to households and to other industrial, non-electricity sectors,
and is distributed according to Del = yel/xel =1yel/1xel.
We assume the fraction of production capacity lost in non-
electricity sectors to be γi 6=el =1yel/yel =1Tel/Tel. We
generally find
1T
T
= 1x−1y
x− y =
1y
D
−1y
y/D− y =
1y
(
1
D
− 1
)
y
(
1
D
− 1
) = 1y
y
.
Thereafter, final and intermediate demand is relative (not
necessarily absolute) curtailed equally. If 1x =1y, i.e.,
1T = 0, one would minimize total economic damage, be-
cause the indirect impacts on supply chains and international
trade are missing from the assessment of the damage caused
by the geomagnetic storm.
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